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This article develops a novel account of middle‐range theories for combining theoretical and 
empirical analysis in explanatory sociology. I first revisit Robert K. Merton’s original ideas on 
middle‐range theories and identify a tension between his developmental approach to middle‐range 
theorizing that recognizes multiple functions of theories in sociological research and his static 
definition of the concept of middle‐range theory that focuses only on empirical testing of theories. 
Drawing on Merton's ideas on theorizing and recent discussions on mechanism‐based explanations, I 
argue that this tension can be resolved by decomposing a middle‐range theory into three interrelated 
and evolving components that perform different functions in sociological research: (i) a conceptual 
framework about social phenomena that is a set of interrelated concepts that evolve in close 
connection with empirical analysis; (ii) a mechanism schema that is an abstract and incomplete 
description of a social mechanism; and (iii) a cluster of all mechanism‐based explanations of social 
phenomena that are based on the particular mechanism schema. I show how these components 
develop over time and how they serve different functions in sociological theorizing and research. 
Finally, I illustrate these ideas by discussing Merton’s theory of the Matthew effect in science and its 
more recent applications in sociology. 





Robert K. Merton coined the concept of middle-range theory in the late 1940’s. Since then the concept 
has been ‘widely discussed, lavishly praised, often misunderstood, sometimes abused, and even 
“obliterated by incorporation”’ (Stzompka 1986: 111). The reason why the notion of middle-range 
theory continues to draw sociologists’ attention seems to be that it promises to integrate different 
types of research activities, such as theoretical and empirical analysis, micro- and macro-analysis, 
and basic and applied research. In addition, middle-range theories are often said to create connections 
between different research fields.  
I share the view that Merton’s ideas on middle-range theories contain valuable insights for combining 
theorizing with empirical analysis but I argue that his notion of middle-range theory should be revised 
before it can be applied in current sociology. I begin my argument by indicating that there is a tension 
in Merton’s (e.g. 1968a) views on middle-range theories: On the one hand, he emphasizes the 
developing nature of middle-range theories and their multiple functions in sociological research. On 
the other hand, his definition of the concept of middle-range theory in terms of logically 
interconnected theoretical propositions is entirely static and focuses on empirical testability of these 
theories. In order to resolve this tension, I argue that we should reject Merton’s static and single-
function definition and develop an account of middle-range theories that is consistently dynamic and 
does justice also to their other functions in sociological research, such as providing concepts for 
identifying and describing social phenomena to be explained, formulating explanatory questions 
about them, explaining these phenomena and consolidating theories developed in different research 
fields. 
I build this argument by combining the idea of middle-range theory with the mechanism approach to 
explanation. Then I propose that middle-range theories should be understood as evolving entities that 
have three components: (i) a conceptual framework about social phenomena, (ii) a mechanism 
schema and (iii) a cluster of mechanism-based explanations of social phenomena that are based on 
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the mechanism schema. I argue that this view allows us to recognize different epistemic functions of 
middle-range theories and to analyse in detail the interplay between middle-range theorizing and 
empirical research over time. Although this argument draws on Merton’s ideas, my aim is not to 
provide a historical exegesis of Merton’s texts but to clarify and elaborate his most fruitful insights 
on middle-range theorizing for explanatory sociology. 
Merton’s concept of middle-range theory 
Merton’s notion of middle-range theory has often been regarded as one of the most important 
blueprints for combining theoretical and empirical analysis in sociological research. Yet, many 
authors have noted that this concept was incompletely defined and somewhat ambiguous in Merton’s 
work (e.g., Blalock 1990: 388; Boudon 1991: 519–20; Crothers 2009; Geels 2007: 629; Gould 1990; 
Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Hedström and Udehn 2009; Pawson 2000: 283–84; Sztompka 1986: 
109–10; Turner 2009). These complaints are understandable given that Merton did not provide a 
comprehensive definition of the concept of middle-range theory, nor did he develop a detailed 
methodological program for developing and testing middle-range theories. Without intending to 
engage in debates about what Merton really meant by the concept of middle-range theory and how 
this type of theories relate to the other kinds of sociological theories, I briefly describe his 
characterizations of middle-range theories and identify a tension in his views.  
Merton (1948) introduced the concept of middle-range theory to sociologists in a critical commentary 
on Talcott Parsons’ approach to social theory. In a later, more developed and extended discussion, 
Merton (1968a: 39) writes that middle-range theories ‘lie between the minor but necessary working 
hypothesis that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic 
efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, 
social organization and social change.’ In addition to indicating what middle-range theories are not, 
he also describes some positive features and functions of these theories. 
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According to Merton (1968a), the main function of middle-range theories is to ‘guide empirical 
inquiry’ (p. 39). He also writes that this type of theories ‘involve abstractions, but […] are close 
enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing’ (p. 39). In 
addition, he states that middle-range theories ‘deal with delimited aspects of social phenomena’ (pp. 
39–40) and are ‘sufficiently abstract to deal with differing spheres of social behavior and social 
structure, so that they transcend sheer description or empirical generalization’ (p. 68). Even though 
they ‘are frequently consistent with a variety of so-called systems of sociological theory’ (p. 43), 
Merton holds that middle-range theories ‘have not been logically derived from a single all-embracing 
theory of social systems’ (p. 41). It is also important for him that middle-range theories ‘generate an 
array of theoretical problems’ (p. 45) for sociologists to investigate and that they ‘do not remain 
separate but are consolidated into wider networks of theory’ (p. 68). Furthermore, he contends that 
the middle-range orientation enables sociologists to recognize ‘what must still be learned in order to 
lay foundation for still more knowledge’ (p. 68) and that middle-range theories cut ‘across the 
distinction between micro-sociological problems [… ] and macro-sociological problems’ (p. 68). 
According to his view, it is also fruitful to imitate ‘tactics of theorizing’ used by classics of sociology 
when one selects and formulates problems for middle-range theorizing (p. 68). Despite these various 
characterizations, Merton provides a single-function and static definition of middle-range theories 
according to which they ‘consist of limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are 
logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigation’ (p. 68). This definition only mentions the 
function of empirical confirmation and focuses on deductively related propositions between the 
statements describing theoretical assumptions and those describing their empirical consequences, 
thereby presupposing that middle-range theories are static sets of propositions. 
As these citations indicate, there is a tension in Merton’s (1968a) descriptions of middle-range 
theories: On the one hand he suggests that middle-range theories guide empirical inquiry in various 
ways, develop in close contact with empirical analysis and may be consolidated into wider networks. 
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The developmental approach to theorizing is especially prominent in his two methodological essays, 
‘The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research’ and ‘The Bearing of Empirical Research 
on Sociological Theory’, as well as in his substantial theoretical essays on the development of 
particular theories of the middle-range, such as the theory of reference-groups (chapters 10–11) and 
the theory of role set (Merton 1957). These essays include a number of important observations and 
illustrations of how empirical research ‘shape the development of theory’ (Merton 1968a: 157) and 
how sociological theories can be consolidated into networks of middle-range theories. On the other 
hand, when he defines the concept of sociological theory, Merton (ibid., 39; also 68) relies on the 
static view of theories, according to which ‘the term sociological theory refers to logically 
interconnected sets of propositions from which empirical uniformities can be derived.’ This view is 
compatible both with the above definition of middle-range theories and with the hypothetico-
deductive model of scientific method. The latter is a normative model for testing of hypothetical 
theories that are often considered sets of general statements from which statements about empirical 
phenomena can be deductively derived with the help of statements describing auxiliary assumptions.  
The static definition that emphasizes empirical testability is often accepted in more recent discussions 
on middle-range theories. For example, Raymond Boudon (1991: 520) suggests that Merton’s notion 
of middle-range theory ‘describes effectively what the other scientists [except sociologists] ‘call 
simply “theory”’, and continues that a scientific theory ‘is a set of statements that organizes a set of 
hypotheses and relate them to segregated observations.’ Ray Pawson (2000), in turn, contends that 
Merton’s ‘concept of “middle-range theory” still provides the clearest blueprint of theory-driven 
empirical inquiry’ (p. 283) but notes that Merton failed to specify ‘all the steps in the design and 
construction’ (p. 284) of this type of theories. Despite his interesting interpretation of the development 
of Merton’s reference group theory and useful suggestion to combine middle-range theorizing to the 
mechanism-based model of explanation, Pawson (e.g. p. 320), much like Merton, ends up defining 
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middle-range theories in terms of the static set of assumptions from which sociologists deduce ‘an 
array of propositions’ that describe empirical phenomena.  
In contrast to these views, I argue that we should reject Merton’s single-function and static definition 
and develop a consistently dynamic account of middle-range theories that does justice to their 
multiple functions in sociological research. The problem with Merton’s definition is that it disregards 
other activities of middle-range theorizing except empirical testing of theories. In addition, 
discussions that revolve around this definition tend to highlight the importance of classifying different 
types of sociological theories while distracting attention from Merton’s methodological ideas on how 
middle-range theorizing can be combined with empirical analysis.  
Middle-range theories and mechanism-based explanations  
How, then, should we develop a dynamic view of middle-range theories that allows us to do justice 
to their multiple functions? In this section, I suggest that a mechanism approach to explanation 
provides useful conceptual tools for such a project. Before discussing this approach in detail, let me 
briefly consider its relation to Merton’s work. 
Merton clearly assumed that one of the functions of a middle-range theory is to provide an explanation 
for a bounded range of social phenomena. Nevertheless, his views on sociological explanations were 
somewhat eclectic and, at least to some extent, problematic. For example, the functional explanations 
that Merton sometimes developed in his substantial research (despite the fact that he also perceptively 
criticized functionalism in sociology) have been convincingly criticized by some of his commentators 
(e.g. Elster 1983: chapter 2; Turner 2009: 203–6). However, Merton was also one of the first 
sociologists who systematically used the concept of social mechanism. He defined social mechanisms 
as ‘the social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of the social structure’ 
(Merton 1968a: 43). Peter Hedström and Lars Udehn (2009: 32) have also noted that many of 
Merton’s sociological theories can be interpreted as ‘accounts of mechanisms rather than as general 
axiomatic systems.’ His theories of the Matthew effect (Merton 1968b; 1988), of the self-fulfilling 
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prophecy (Merton 1968a: chapter 13) and of the social mechanisms that sustain role sets (Merton 
1957) are the clearest cases in point – and Merton, too, called them social mechanisms. In addition to 
Hedström and Udehn (2009) and other analytical sociologists, the affinity between Merton’s notion 
of middle-range theory and the idea of mechanism-based explanation has been recognized by several 
other scholars who do not associate themselves with the movement of analytical sociology (e.g. Little 
2011: 278; Pawson 2000; Tilly 2010). For these reasons, I submit that Merton’s notion of middle-
range theory can be further developed by drawing on the mechanism approach.  
Hedström (2005: 232) aptly states that ‘the core idea behind the mechanism approach is that we 
explain not by evoking universal laws, or by identifying statistically relevant factors, but by 
specifying mechanisms that show how phenomena are brought about.’ Though this much is agreed 
by the most advocates of the mechanism approach, there is no consensus about how to define the 
concept of causal mechanism (see Gross 2009; Mayntz 2004; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Yet, I 
find Hedström’s (2005: 25) abstract and concise definition sufficient for the purposes of this article: 
[causal] mechanisms can be said to consist of entities (with their properties) and the 
activities that these entities engage in, either by themselves or in concert with other 
entities. These activities bring about change, and the type of change brought about 
depends upon the properties of the entities and the way in which they are linked to one 
another.  
This ontic (or realist) definition draws on Peter Machamer’s and his collaborators influential article 
on the mechanistic philosophy of science (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000). It implies that causal 
mechanisms are neither intervening variables nor pieces of theories. Furthermore, this definition can 
be effectively used to differentiate the mechanism approach to explanation from the functional, the 
structuralist, the unificationist and the covering-law models of explanation. It also seems to be 
compatible with more specific ontic accounts of causal mechanisms in the social sciences (e.g. Archer 
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2015; Bunge 1997; Goldthorpe 2007; Gross 2009; Little 2011, 2016; Manicas 2006; Mayntz 2004; 
Pawson 2000). 
The highly abstract view of causal mechanisms should be specified when applied in sociological 
research. A plausible way to do so is to combine it with the idea of action-based explanation in which 
many structurally situated and interacting social actors (with desires, beliefs, emotions, attitudes, 
interests, heuristics, cognitive frames, biases, habits etc.) form the core entities of social mechanisms 
(e.g. Elster 1989; Hedström 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Manicas 2006; Little 2016). In this 
view, theoretical representations of social mechanisms should specify the assumptions that 
sociologists make about social actors – including their properties, opportunity structures and activities 
–  and the relations between these actors and their modes of interaction. Nevertheless, in contrast to 
what some sociologists have claimed (e.g. Goldthrope 2007; Gross 2009; Hedström 2005), I do not 
see any compelling reasons why the mechanism approach should be tied to a specific theory of action 
(cf. Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 60–1). Hence, my view is that many complementary action theories 
can be utilized in developing mechanism-based explanations (Kaidesoja 2012) and that at least some 
organizations (e.g. corporations, governments and universities) may be counted, too, as purposive 
actors in some mechanism-based explanations − in addition to the types of human individuals – since 
it is plausible to attribute causal properties and purposes to suitably organized groups (Kaidesoja 
2013).  
When we appeal to a social mechanism in an explanation of the outcome of a concrete social process, 
we can expect that it is intertwined with other mechanisms (and various contingent occurrences) 
whose concatenations generated the observed outcome (cf. Gambetta 1998; Hedström 2005: 56–8; 
Manicas 2006). For this reason, mechanism-based explanations often explain by isolating only the 
key aspects of the causal structures of concrete social processes (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 61–
2). In some occasions, it is also reasonable to assume that the operations and outcomes of a social 
mechanism depend on the particular type of structural conditions that may, for example, enable, 
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stimulate, constraint or channel social interactions (e.g., Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 60; Mayntz 
2004; Pawson 2000: 296–7). In cases of this kind, these broader structural conditions, such as role 
structures, network structures, infrastructures or institutional frameworks, should also be cited in 
mechanism-based explanations of social phenomena. 
Toward a dynamic and multifunctional account of middle-range theories 
On the basis of the previous discussions, I propose a new interpretation of middle-range theories by 
distinguishing three evolving components of a middle-range theory that perform different functions 
in sociological research: 
(i) A conceptual framework about social phenomena is an evolving set of interrelated concepts 
that is used at least for four epistemic purposes: (a) identifying, describing and empirically 
establishing a class of social phenomena that is worth explaining; (b) formulating explanatory 
questions about social phenomena; (c) developing one or more hypothetical mechanism 
schema(s) that can be used to explain one or more social phenomena; and (d) specifying the 
relations between closely related social phenomena.  
(ii) A mechanism schema is an abstract and incomplete description of the social mechanism that 
is applied to specific explanatory tasks in order to provide mechanism-based explanations for 
one or more social phenomena (cf. Darden 2002: S356). An evolving toolbox of interrelated 
mechanism schemas that is built in sociological research also embodies general knowledge 
about the social world (cf. Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 61). 
(iii) A cluster of mechanism-based explanations consists of all explanations of social phenomena 
that are based on the particular mechanism schema. The procedures through which 
sociologists apply the mechanism schema to different explanatory tasks may not only enable 
them to provide evidence for the hypothesis derived from the schema and to specify its area 
of applicability (or scope conditions). They may also be used to offer empirically based 
reasons to refine, revise or reject the mechanism schema. When they apply the mechanism 
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schema to a new explanatory task, sociologists may use the earlier explanations included in 
the cluster as their exemplars. 
In this view, social phenomena addressed in middle-range theories are typically the types of outcomes 
that are produced by the social processes that have a similar causal structure. Following analytical 
sociologists (e.g. Hedström and Udehn 2009; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 61–2), I assume here that 
middle-range theories can be classified by focusing on their mechanism schemas.i Unlike analytical 
sociologists, I emphasize that, in addition to a mechanism schema, we should also include a 
conceptual framework about social phenomena and a cluster of mechanism-based explanations as 
components of a middle-range theory that is applied to explain a range of social phenomena. In what 
follows, I briefly elaborate each component, their interrelations and my reasons to include them as 
evolving parts of middle-range theories.  These views are partly descriptive and partly prescriptive: I 
not only aim to provide a plausible account of the actual research practices pertaining to middle-range 
theorizing but also make some suggestions how to improve these practices. 
Although the evolving conceptual frameworks about social phenomena are not usually included as 
parts of middle-range theories, I think that they should be for at least two reasons. The first is that, as 
already noted, they are crucially important for many different epistemic purposes in explanatory 
sociological research. I take this point to be obvious. Hence, it is a mistake to reduce the role of 
interrelated concepts about social phenomena to a single epistemic purpose ― such as empirical 
testing of theories by using deductive procedures ― that they may serve at a particular phase of 
research process and, thereby, to ignore other functions of evolving conceptual frameworks in 
sociological theorizing. These views are in line with the so called grounded theory approach (e.g. 
Glaser and Strauss 1967) to theory-building but my emphasis on mechanism-based explanations and 
abductive reasoning distinguishes my account of middle-range theories from grounded theorizing. 
The second reason is that also Merton clearly recognized that conceptual schemes (in my 
terminology: conceptual frameworksii) about social phenomena are important in middle-range 
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theorizing. Merton (e.g. 1957; 1968a; 1968b; 1976) not only developed many highly useful 
sociological concepts, classifications and typologies in his theoretical work. He also wrote that ‘it is 
only when […] concepts are interrelated in the form of a scheme that a theory begins to emerge’ 
(Merton 1968a: 143) and that more general conceptual schemes are needed to ‘consolidate groups of 
special theories’ (p. 51). Nevertheless, one of the core messages of Merton’s work in sociological 
theory is that there is no ‘master conceptual scheme’ (p. 51) that would enable sociologists to unify 
all social phenomena. In my view, it would be futile to even try to develop such a master scheme 
given the heterogeneity, complexity and historicity of social phenomena studied in sociology (see 
also Little 2016). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that all conceptual frameworks about social 
phenomena are more or less local even though it is occasionally possible to consolidate two or more 
frameworks developed in different research fields by means of constructing more abstract conceptual 
categories.  
The adequacy of sociologists’ conceptual frameworks about social phenomena depends partly on the 
specific epistemic aims of their users and partly on the nature of those social phenomena being 
studied. This means that sociologists may define and classify a particular social process (or some of 
its aspects) by using many different conceptual frameworks depending on their epistemic purposes. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that in middle-range theorizing sociologists commonly aim to develop a 
systematic conceptual framework that provides a context for a series of empirical studies that may be 
said to articulate the framework. Since they build frameworks of this kind on the basis of their 
empirical observations and data analysis, the concepts included in the conceptual framework of a 
middle-range theory can be assumed to consist of the accounts of the key attributes of a range of 
interrelated social phenomena, the key relations between these attributes and the key dimensions of 
their variation. Next I will outline four procedures that can be used in articulating and transforming 
conceptual frameworks about social phenomena (cf. Merton 1968a: chapter 5). 
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The first procedure consists of enriching the concepts in the framework. In this research activity, 
sociologists add new attributes or dimensions to the concepts that are included in the conceptual 
framework on the basis of what they have learnt about the social phenomenon under investigation. 
For example, a sociologist may propose a new definition for Merton’s (1968b) concept of Matthew 
effect in science that further specifies its key attributes or adds new attributes to the concept without 
modifying those already included in it (I will consider Merton’s middle-range theory of the Matthew 
effect in science more closely in the next section).  
The second procedure is comprised of horizontal integration of new concepts to the framework. When 
using this procedure, sociologists add new conceptual categories to the framework such that these 
categories are considered as the subcategories of the more abstract and general theoretical category 
that is already included in the framework. This procedure not only requires that one defines the key 
attributes of each category added to the framework. One should also specify how each new category 
is different from the other categories at the same conceptual level. For example, a sociologist may 
develop conceptual categories for new subtypes of Matthew effects in science by defining their key 
attributes and how they differ from those subtypes that have been already conceptualized by Merton 
and other sociologists of science.  
The third procedure, in turn, involves vertical integration of new concepts to the framework. The idea 
here is that a sociologist introduces a new abstract category to the framework that connects different 
concepts (or creates a conceptual bridge between different conceptual frameworks) that were earlier 
regarded as separate. This can be done by means of abstracting the common attributes from two or 
more categories used in different conceptual frameworks. For example, in one of his later papers on 
the Matthew effects in science, Merton (1988) vertically integrates the highly abstract category of 
accumulation of advantage to the conceptual framework pertaining to the Matthew effects in science. 
This highly abstract category has enabled sociologists to consolidate the Mathew effects in science, 
the bandwagon effects in elections and the path-dependent increasing returns in economy as subtypes 
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of the same general social phenomenon, which is the accumulation of advantage (e.g. DiPrete and 
Eirich 2006; Rigney 2010; Zuckerman 1998). In this way, sociologists can build theoretical bridges 
between middle-range theories developed in different fields of social research.  
None of the three procedures discussed so far changes the relations between those concepts that are 
already included in the conceptual framework about social phenomena. Rather, they are used to enrich 
the concepts included in the framework or to expand the framework by specifying new horizontal and 
vertical relations between the old concepts included in the framework and the new concepts that are 
introduced to it. In contrast, the fourth procedure of modifying the conceptual framework is more 
radical since it consist of restructuring of the framework. When using this procedure, sociologists 
make such conceptual innovations that change the relations between the concepts that are included in 
the framework.  
For instance, when he coined the concept of role set, Merton (1957), at least arguably, restructured 
the conceptual framework of the earlier functionalist role theory in which social positions in social 
systems (e.g. schools, factories or companies) were associated with unified social roles. Merton’s 
core claims were that (i) a single social position (e.g. a position of the primary school teacher) is 
associated with (or has its key attributes) many role relations (e.g. teachers’ relations to pupils, 
colleagues, school principal and parents), which comprise the role set of the position, and that (ii) 
different role relations associated with a social position often include mutually incompatible 
expectations regarding the role incumbents’ behaviour in the position. This conceptual innovation not 
only enabled him to restructure the conceptual framework of the earlier functionalist role theory 
where a single social position was associated with a single role, defining a unified set of behavioural 
expectations. It also allowed Merton to develop new ideas and research questions about those social 
mechanisms that enable the members of organized groups to sustain their activities and groups over 
time in situations where each member faces mutually incompatible expectations regarding her social 
activities in her social position. 
14 
 
Let us move on to the second component of a middle-range theory. If we accept the mechanism 
approach to explanation, it is clear that an empirically established phenomenon cannot be explained 
by merely (re-)describing it in terms of a conceptual framework. What is needed to provide 
mechanism-based explanations for social phenomena are mechanism schemas that can be used to 
answer the explanatory questions about these phenomena: why and how this phenomenon is/was 
brought about? Hence, a mechanism schema, understood as an abstract and incomplete description 
of a social mechanism, forms the second component of a middle-range theory. When sociologists 
provide mechanism-based explanations for those social phenomena that they have identified and 
described using the conceptual framework, they apply the mechanism schema to a particular 
explanatory task. I will return to this procedure when I address the cluster of mechanism-based 
explanations. Next I will focus on outlining some procedures through which new mechanism schemas 
may be built and articulated. 
Sociologists may develop new mechanism schemas by inferring them abductively (or retroductively) 
from their descriptions of the empirically established social phenomena (cf. Swedberg 2014; Tavory 
and Timmermans 2014). According to Charles S. Peirce (1934: 171–172), abduction ‘is the process 
of forming an explanatory hypothesis’. Without going into details of Peirce’s philosophy of science, 
I assume here that a sociologist may use abduction to re-conceptualize the social phenomenon of her 
interest as an outcome generated by a hypothesized social mechanism that is described in terms of a 
new mechanism schema. The fallible inferences of this kind may be facilitated by means of analogical 
reasoning from the available mechanism schemas and already accepted mechanism-based 
explanations (cf. Becker 2014: Chapter 3). Also the method of theory-building process-tracing (e.g. 
Beach and Pedersen 2013; Kaidesoja 2018) and the abstract theoretical ideas provided by a 
researcher’s general sociological orientation might be helpful here (cf. Merton 1968a: 141−43). A 
detailed discussion of these inferences and procedures exceeds the scope of this article. 
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When sociologists develop new mechanism schemas that can potentially be employed in explaining 
a delimited range of social phenomena, they should describe at least the key social actors (with their 
causally relevant properties) as well as their activities, relations and interactions that could underlie 
or produce the phenomena of interest. In some cases, a mechanism schema may also include 
description of those temporal stages that link the triggering conditions of the causal mechanism (if 
they are known) to the outcome that it produces. Descriptions of these stages should meet the 
requirement of productive continuity according to which the earlier stage of the mechanism should 
be capable of producing the next stage of the mechanism. In addition, a description of the context(s) 
where the mechanism is expected to operate can be added to the mechanism schema to specify its 
area of applicability (or scope conditions). 
Mechanism schemas of this kind provide sociologists with abstract representations of causal 
mechanisms that they can use to isolate what might be called ‘the causal interaction structure’ shared 
by the classes of causally similar social processes – or at least the most important aspects of this 
structure (cf. Hedström 2005, 26; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 52–3). Hence, mechanism schemas 
are not empirical generalizations about social phenomena nor are they directly abstracted from 
empirical descriptions of social phenomena. Rather, as already indicated above, mechanism schemas 
are theoretical constructs about causal mechanisms that sociologists abductively infer from their 
descriptions of social phenomena by using the theoretical resources available to them. In addition, 
sociologists may also confirm, refine, revise or reject mechanism schemas on the basis of evidence 
provided by the studies where they seek to apply the schema in order to explain social phenomena. 
The third component of a middle-range theory consists of the cluster of those explanations that are 
based on the mechanism schema. These mechanism-based explanations can be expected to form a 
cluster in the sense that they (more or less) resemble each other for two reasons: (i) they are based on 
the same mechanism schema that ties them together and (ii) sociologists tend to use earlier 
explanatory studies as their exemplars in their later studies that apply the same schema. When a 
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mechanism schema is applied to a particular explanatory task, it is concretized by filling in its 
attributes such that it becomes suitable for the social phenomenon under study. In addition, new 
evidence that can be used in the empirical evaluation of the hypothesized mechanism-based 
explanation is acquired in this research activity (cf. Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 52–3). What is the 
proper level of concreteness and spatiotemporal scale of the descriptions of the social actors, 
activities, interactions and outcomes of the social mechanisms depends on a particular explanatory 
task of the researcher and the methods that she uses. Though the detailed analysis of different 
explanatory tasks goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is useful to make a rough distinction between 
two research designs that allow sociologist to provide causal explanations of social phenomena.  
The first consist of experimental and quasi-experimental designs that are based on the logic of 
randomized controlled experiments that use randomly assigned test and control groups. This type of 
research designs enable sociologists to produce evidence for causal claims and causal models which, 
in their simplest form, are propositions representing the relations of dependence between the values 
of the independent variable, which are experimentally manipulated, and the values of the dependent 
variable. Sociologist may use the conceptual framework about social phenomena as a source of 
concepts that are operationalized in this type of designs. Also mechanism schemas could be employed 
in developing theoretical hypothesis and statistical models that may be utilised in building 
experimental designs. However, the real strength of experimental designs is that they allow to make 
inferences about the average-effects of the cause variables in a population under study. In other words, 
experimental methods provide an effective way of controlling the effects of confounding variables in 
those research situations where (at least the most important) assumptions for their application are met 
— situations which are relatively rare in sociology (e.g. Goldthorpe 2007, 196–203). Sociologists 
may also use this type of research designs to raise new research questions about those social 
mechanisms that may link the manipulated cause variables to their average-effects, but experimental 
and quasi-experimental designs do not enable them to provide evidence about the details of social 
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mechanisms nor evidence for deciding whether and how a specific causal mechanism unfolds in a 
particular case. To these ends other kinds of research designs are needed. 
Some advocates of the mechanism approach have argued that case study research designs are useful 
for developing and empirically testing mechanism-based explanations of social phenomena, 
especially if social scientists utilise many different sources of evidence regarding the hypothesized 
causal mechanisms and use process-tracing in their case studies (e.g. Beach and Pedersen 2013; 
George and Bennett 2005; see also Becker 2014). These authors seem to agree that process-tracing 
provides effective methodological tools for making within-case causal inferences about the 
operations of a causal mechanism in a particular case. In this view, the case study designs employing 
process-tracing can be said to complement experimental and quasi-experimental designs. They 
provide promising opportunities for developing new mechanism schemas and testing mechanism-
based explanations of the cases of a social phenomenon (Kaidesoja 2018). Nevertheless, process-
tracing should be combined with the small-N comparative, the statistical and/or the experimental 
methods if one wants to make cross-case causal inferences (e.g. Beach and Pedersen 2013). How 
exactly these different types of research designs and methods may be fruitfully combined in empirical 
research is currently discussed in the context multi-methods research.  
No matter which type of research design she chooses, a sociologist who applies a mechanism schema 
to a particular explanatory task should compare the hypothesized explanation with the competing 
explanations of the social phenomenon. To this end she needs to provide empirical evidence that 
discriminates between competing explanations (e.g. Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 52–3). If the 
hypothesized explanation accounts the empirical evidence better than the competing explanations, it 
can be added to the cluster of mechanism-based explanations. It is also possible that there are two or 
more explanations that are equally well supported by the relevant evidence which means that the 
evidence alone does not allow sociologists to infer which one is the best explanation. Attempts to 
apply the mechanism schema may also provide empirically based reasons to refine, revise or reject 
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the schema. New mechanism schemas that sociologists develop on the basis of what they have learned 
from the failed applications of the old mechanism schemas should be evaluated by means of acquiring 
new evidence that is independent from the evidence that was used to disconfirm the earlier version 
of the schema. 
It is important to note that the above views are strictly speaking incompatible with the hypothetico-
deductive model since the relation between a mechanism schema and an explanation based on the 
application of this schema is not a deductive relation for at least two reasons. The first is that abstract 
mechanism schemas do not always take the form of propositional statements (that are required by the 
hypothetico-deductive model) but may also be represented in the form of diagrams, flow-charts or 
computer simulations that are not translated to propositions. The second reason is that the proper 
application of the abstract mechanism schema requires that sociologists fill in the schema on the basis 
of inductive analysis of the social phenomenon under explanation. This procedure is different from 
the procedure of specifying the auxiliary assumptions in order to deduce empirically testable 
consequences from the set of abstract theoretical statements. Though the procedure of filling in the 
mechanism schema may allow sociologists to develop a hypothetical model that can be tested by 
using deductive methods, this model is a particular application of the mechanism schema rather than 
the abstract schema itself.  This is not to deny, however, that the assumptions included in mechanism 
schemas should be compatible with what is known about the relevant entities, activities, relations and 
interactions on the basis of earlier empirical studies in sociology and in other relevant sciences 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 60–61). 
The case of Matthew effect 
To briefly illustrate these rather abstract ideas, I reconstruct Merton’s (1968b) theory of the Matthew 
effect in science in terms of the above account of middle-range theories. Merton begins his famous 
paper on Matthew effects by describing his observations about the reward system of science. These 
four are among the most important and carefully documented observations:  
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(i) Rewards in science are mostly based on peer-recognition and highly unevenly distributed 
among scientists; 
(ii) There is a very limited number of many awards (e.g. Nobel Prizes or chairs in National 
Academies) in science, resulting in situations where some scientists equally merited to 
those of the awarded do not get an award;  
(iii) In the cases of collaboration (e.g. writing a paper together) between the widely recognized 
scientists and their less recognized collaborators, the credit of the joint contributions to 
science tend to be allocated only to the already famous scientists; 
(iv) In the historical cases of multiple independent discoveries by the widely recognized and 
unknown scientists, scientific discoveries tend to be attributed only to the already famous 
scientists (pp. 56–58). 
Merton (1968b) argues that these and some other observations provide evidence for the phenomenon 
of widening inequality in recognitions among scientists that is only partly explained by the scientific 
quality of their contributions. He names this phenomenon as ‘the Matthew effect in science’. Merton 
also tells us that these observations are based on many sources, including the previous research in the 
sociology of science, citation indices, the well-known facts about the reward system of science and 
Harriet Zuckerman’s interviews with Nobel Laureates in the US. 
In his descriptions of these observations, Merton (1968b) utilises the interrelated concepts pertaining 
to scientific institutions and activities, including the concepts of reward and communication system 
of science, peer-review, scientific collaboration and multiple discovery. These concepts that have 
been specified in Merton’s and his collaborators’ earlier work in the sociology of science may be said 
to form an evolving conceptual framework that enabled him to identify, describe and empirically 
establish the phenomenon of Mathew effect and some of its subtypes. In combination with his general 
sociological orientation, the conceptual framework also served as basis for his abductive inferences 
about those social mechanisms that could generate Matthew effects in science. Hence, I suggest that 
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this evolving conceptual framework can be understood as a component of the middle-range theory of 
Matthew effect. 
As all sociologists know, Merton coins the memorable term ‘Matthew effect’ by referring to the 
Gospel according to Matthew which states that ‘For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he 
shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath’ 
(Merton 1968b: 58). In the context of science, then, ‘the Matthew effect consists in the accruing of 
greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable 
repute and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark’ (p. 
58). In this definition, Merton integrates a number of previously unconnected observations about 
science and suggests that they may be understood in terms of those social processes that tend to 
accumulate recognitions disproportionately to scientists whose earlier scientific contributions are 
already widely recognized. The definition presupposes the contrast between the social processes 
where the Matthew mechanisms generate Matthew effects and the counterfactual processes where 
recognitions were allocated solely on the basis of ‘the objective scientific quality’iii of scientists’ 
contributions to science and where the reputations and former merits of scientists would not, 
therefore, affect the allocation of recognitions in science. In other words, the Matthew effects in 
science violate the norm of universalism, according to which scientific contributions should be 
evaluated using “pre-established impersonal criteria”, that Merton (1968a: 607) argued to 
characterize the ethos of science. 
In his descriptions of the phenomenon of Matthew effect, Merton (1968b: 58, 62; 1998: 613–617) 
already hints that this effect may be understood as the outcome of social mechanisms (hereafter: 
Matthew mechanisms) that misallocate recognitions and rewards in science. Though Merton (e.g. 
1988: 616) acknowledges that, especially in the early career stages, the role performance of the 
scientist which exceeds the expectations of the relevant others may trigger Matthew mechanisms that 
accelerate her career, Merton (1968b: 57–9) also emphasizes that, in the long run, these mechanisms 
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generate such cumulative advantages and disadvantages between researchers which cannot be 
accounted by referring to exceptional role performance, talent or the scientific quality of the 
contributions of individual scientists alone. These considerations raise two questions: What are these 
Matthew mechanisms that contribute to the skewed distribution of recognitions by misallocating 
recognitions and resources in science? How do they operate in different institutional settings? 
Although Merton (1968b) does not use the notion of mechanism schema, his descriptions of Matthew 
mechanisms can be usefully articulated with the help of this notion. Hence, I suggest that a qualitative 
schema of Matthew mechanism includes the following elements (I have bolded the terms that refer 
to different types of actors):iv 
(i) Actors (with properties): researchers (who are capable of doing research, affiliated to 
different research organizations and aim to advance their careers) and resource 
providers (who are capable and authorized to allocate resources for research and tend to 
believe that the reputation and past contributions of a researcher are the reliable 
indicators of her current and future contributions to science). 
(ii) Activities of actors: researchers not only produce scientific contributions by exploiting 
the available resources and opportunities but also apply new resources for further 
research; resource providers select researchers to whom they allocate resources on the 
basis of their perceived reputations, track records and other particularistic standards that 
are used to assess scientific quality. 
(iii) Relations and interactions: the relations of competition between researchers for scarce 
resources and the relations of scientific collaboration between researchers that in concert 
give rise to the positive feedback loop that is maintained by the social interactions 
between researchers and resource providers through which already resourceful 
researchers tend to acquire a disproportionate share of the available resources for 
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research, providing them with further opportunities to acquire new resources for research 
more efficiently than less resourceful researchers. 
(iv) Outcomes: the skewed distribution of resources for research between competing 
researchers and the amplification of the small initial differences in resources between 
researchers over time. 
This is a mechanism schema since the attributes of researchers and resource providers and their 
activities are highly abstract and incomplete. In other words, the schema does not make references to 
any particular time or place nor does it detail the nature of resources or the identity of relevant actors, 
meaning that the basic explanatory concepts have not (yet) been operationalized (in the broad sense). 
Hence, the Mathew mechanism schema aims to provide an abstract representation of those social 
mechanisms through which scientific success tends to breed more success, but the schema does not 
by itself answer any specific research question about any concrete social phenomenon.  
I propose that Merton’s (1968b) essay contains two concretized versions of this highly abstract 
mechanism schema. The first one is the variant of Matthew mechanism that operates through the 
citation practices in the context of scientific communication. In this variant, peer-recognitions 
embodied in citations in peer-reviewed journals are the key ‘symbolic resources’ (or recognitions that 
can be later translated into resources) that researchers allocate to each other. The second one is the 
variant of Matthew mechanism operating in the context of the reward system of science. In this 
variant, the key resources consist of scientific awards, research grants and positions in prestigious 
universities that are allocated to researchers by the award committees, the recruiters of universities 
and the funding organizations. Merton’s descriptions of these two subtypes of Matthew mechanisms 
share the assumption that Matthew effects are generated as an unintended outcome of self-reinforcing 
interactions in a certain institutional context where researchers compete for scarce resources. Though 
these descriptions fill in some attributes of the abstract Matthew mechanism schema, they are still 
fairly abstract and incomplete. In one of his later papers, Merton (1988: 617) also mentions Matthew 
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mechanisms that operate ‘among scientific institutions’, such as competing universities, and proposes 
that Matthew effects in science can be seen as a subtype of the general pattern of accumulation of 
advantage and disadvantage (see also Zuckerman 1977; 1998).  
When the Matthew mechanism schema is applied to a particular explanatory task, it should be filled 
in to meet the requirements of these tasks and evaluated in the light of new and relevant empirical 
evidence. This can be done by employing different types of research designs (for reviews of empirical 
research pertaining to Mathew effects and accumulation of advantage, see DiPrete and Eirich 2006; 
Merton 1988; Rigney 2010; Zuckerman 1998). Some sociologists who have studied Matthew effects 
in science have used quasi-experimental designs and comparative statistical analysis to investigate 
whether and to what extent Mathew effects can be found in and between different populations of 
researchers that are differentiated, for example, in terms of age, gender, class origin, or discipline. 
Studies of these kinds presuppose the existence of causal mechanism(s) that produce Matthew effects 
in different populations and require the specification of the triggering conditions of this mechanism.v 
They might also enable sociologists to control the effects of ‘the objective scientific quality’ of 
scientific contributions in order to isolate the Matthew effects in a population of interest. However, 
the main limitation of the research designs of this kind is that they do not enable sociologists to 
develop or evaluate theoretical hypothesis about how, or through which social mechanisms, Matthew 
effects are generated. 
Hence, I propose that studies of this kind should be complemented by using case-based research 
designs to produce within-case evidence about the Matthew mechanisms operating in different types 
of institutional contexts. A recent example of this type of study is Barbara Hoenig’s (2017) case study 
that aims to shed light on why and how the European Research Council (ERC) -funding in Europe 
has produced a new scientific elite through the Matthew mechanismsvi that are composed of 
competing researchers, research groups, disciplines, universities and countries in the European 
Research Area. Although she does not use the term mechanism schema, from the viewpoint of the 
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previous account, Hoenig’s study can be said to apply the Matthew mechanism schema to explain 
why and how the institutionalization of the ERC-funding has reinforced social inequalities and 
stratification in the European Research Area. In her descriptions of the Matthew mechanisms of this 
kind, she can be said to fill in the Matthew mechanism schema with the following the details:  
 Description of the cultural and social structure of European research funding that emphasizes 
‘excellence by competition’ and structures the opportunities of researchers in different 
research organizations located in different countries; 
 Descriptions of researcher’s collaborations in team building and of their mentor–apprentice 
relations and other network relations; 
 Descriptions of ERC panellist’s interactions when they evaluate the research proposals of 
researchers following the pre-defined standards and institutional rules for decision-making 
that are not entirely unbiased; 
 Specifications of different feedback loops through which ERC-funding decisions affect the 
kind of knowledge produced by researchers; the rates of growth of different disciplines; the 
growing gaps in funding between different types of research organizations and between 
different countries; and the downward and upward spirals in careers of individual researchers 
in the European Research Area (Hoenig 2017). 
While it is impossible to do justice to Hoenig’s rich case study here, it is a good example of the case 
study that carefully theorizes Matthew mechanisms that operate in the context of ERC-funding and 
provides evidence from multiple sources for its claims about their operations and outcomes. Hence, 
I suggest that Hoenig’s study can be added to the cluster of mechanism-based explanations that can 
be said to apply the Matthew mechanism schema to specific explanatory tasks. Although its 
consideration of alternative explanations is somewhat limited, her study provides an exemplar for 
new case studies that aim to trace Mathew effects in other institutional contexts where Matthew 




Drawing selectively on Merton’s work and recent discussions on mechanism-based explanations, I 
have argued for a dynamic and multifunctional understanding of the concept of middle-range theory. 
In this view, middle-range theories consist of three evolving components ― a conceptual framework 
about social phenomena; a mechanism schema; and a cluster of mechanism-based explanations that 
are based on the mechanism schema ― that perform different functions in sociological research. All 
of these components are involved when sociologists provide mechanism-based explanations for 
social phenomena. I also reconstructed the middle-range theory of Matthew effect in terms of this 
account and formulated some procedures and heuristics for combining theoretical and empirical 
analysis in explanatory sociology and for organizing sociological knowledge.vii 
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i An alternative way of classifying sociological theories of the middle-range would be to differentiate them according to 
(the types of) social phenomena they aim to explain (see Kaidesoja 2018). 
ii I use the term ‘conceptual framework’ instead of ‘conceptual scheme’ since I want to distinguish the notion of conceptual 
framework from the vague neo-Kantian idea of conceptual scheme which allegedly structures the whole phenomenal 
world (cf. Turner 2009: 178–81). Though it seems to me that Merton does not use the term ‘conceptual scheme’ in the 
neo-Kantian sense, this term can lead to unnecessary confusions that can be avoided by using another term. 
iii The notion of ‘objective scientific quality’ is difficult to define and assess although its effects may be controlled by 
comparing essentially similar contributions to science. It also raises thorny epistemological issues that cannot be 
addressed here. 
iv In my reconstruction of the Mathew mechanism schema, I employ the notion of ’resources for scientific research’ to 
cover both peer-recognitions and material resources (e.g. funding) of scientists. My justification for this is that peer-
recognitions in science can be considered symbolic resources that can also be translated to material resources for scientific 
research through writing applications for research grants and research positions at universities (cf. Merton 1988; DiPrete 
and Eirich 2006, 281-282). 
v It should be noted, however, that in some discussions on Matthew effects intervening variables (see DiPrete and Eirich 
2006) are called mechanisms and that this view of mechanisms is different from the one specified above.  
vi Hoenig (2017, 44, 49) uses the terms ’cumulative mechanism’ and ‘mechanism of cumulative (dis-)advantage’ instead 
of ‘Matthew mechanism’ but in so far as these mechanisms generate Mathew effects, as is repeatedly suggested by Hoenig 
(2017, 4, 9, 20, 44, 49), all of these terms refer to the social processes of the same kind. 
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